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This paper investigates the international transmission of productivity shocks
in a sample of ￿ve G7 countries. For each country, using long-run restrictions,
we identify shocks that increase permanently domestic labor productivity in
manufacturing (our measure of tradables) relative to an aggregate of other
industrial countries including the rest of the G7. We ￿nd that, consistent
with standard theory, these shocks raise relative consumption, deteriorate net
exports, and raise the relative price of nontradables ￿ in full accord with
the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Moreover, the deterioration of
the external account is fairly persistent, especially for the US. The response
of the real exchange rate and (our proxy for) the terms of trade di⁄ers across
countries: while both relative prices depreciate in Italy and the UK (smaller
and more open economies), they appreciate in the US and Japan (the largest
and least open economies in our sample); results are however inconclusive for
Germany. These ￿ndings question a common view in the literature, that a
country￿ s terms of trade fall when its output grows, thus providing a mech-
anism to contain di⁄erences in national wealth when productivity levels do
not converge. They enhance our understanding of important episodes such
as the strong real appreciation of the dollar as the US productivity growth
accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. They also provide an empirical
contribution to the current debate on the adjustment of the US current ac-
count position. Contrary to widespread presumptions, productivity growth
in the US tradable sector does not necessarily improve the US trade de￿cit,
nor deteriorate the US terms of trade, at least in the short and medium run.
JEL classi￿cation: F32, F41, F42
Keywords: International transmission mechanism, net exports, terms of
trade, real exchange rates, VAR, long-run restrictions, US current account.1 Introduction
A widespread view of the transmission mechanism holds that a productivity
increase in the traded goods sector of a country should simultaneously lower
the international relative price of domestic tradables (i.e. it should worsen
the country￿ s terms of trade) and raise the relative price of domestic nontrad-
ables ￿ as predicted by to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (henceforth HBS)
hypothesis. A host of theoretical and quantitative models built by academics
and researchers in policy institutions subscribe to this view, with far reach-
ing implications at both theoretical and policy levels. Namely, international
spillovers of productivity shocks are acknowledged to be unambiguously pos-
itive: foreign consumers bene￿ts from an increase in the traded goods￿pro-
duction in the domestic country via reduced import prices (e.g. Corsetti
and Pesenti [2001]). For this very reason, divergences in productivity lev-
els across countries supposedly have a contained e⁄ect on relative national
wealth.1 Moreover, terms of trade movements purportedly reduce the con-
sumption risk of asymmetric productivity shocks: even if international asset
markets do not provide complete insurance, relative price movements sys-
tematically reduce the wedge between domestic and foreign wealth induced
by ￿ uctuations in relative productivity.2 To the extent that international
price movements insure consumption against production risk, the scope for
welfare gains through international policy coordination may be quite limited
(e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [2002]).
However, according to standard general equilibrium open-economy mod-
els, the macroeconomic e⁄ects and the international transmission of technol-
ogy shocks need not be identical across economies that di⁄er in structural
characteristics such as openness and trade elasticities, as well as the degree
of shock persistence. Depending on these features, country-speci￿c gains in
productivity are not necessarily associated with a (short-run) deterioration in
the international relative prices of a country￿ s output and consumption. For
instance, the above conventional wisdom is unable to account for important
episodes such as the US strong dollar and the US terms of trade appreciation
1Acemoglu and Ventura [2003] argue that, because of o⁄setting terms of trade move-
ments, the world distribution of wealth can be stationary even in the absence of techno-
logical spillovers ￿ i.e. if technical progress remains con￿ned to a single country.
2To emphasize this point, Cole and Obstfeld [1991] point out that, with unitary elas-
ticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and no home bias, international
consumption risk sharing can be achieved without any international trade in assets.
1in the second half of the 1990s, which accompanied the productivity boom
in this country (see Corsetti and Pesenti [1999]).
As the international transmission mechanism is at the core of theoretical
modelling and policymaking alike, it is somewhat surprising to ￿nd limited
empirical work on these issues. Taking a step towards addressing this gap
in the literature, this paper analyzes the international transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks in manufacturing among industrial countries. The countries
in our sample ￿ Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and US ￿ di⁄er in size
and degree of openness.3 For each country, we run structural VARs, iden-
tifying productivity shocks in manufacturing using long-run restrictions as
in Gal￿ [1999], Francis and Ramey [2005], and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Vigfusson [2004]. We emphasize two features of our study. First, we focus
on productivity shocks to the tradable sector, rather than to the economy as
a whole, because the theory￿ s predictions are starker for the former than for
the latter. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ects of economy-wide productivity shocks on
the domestic and international relative prices depend heavily on the distrib-
ution of the shock across sectors, making any inference on the international
transmission exceedingly di¢ cult.4 As the bulk of exports in industrialized
countries consists of manufactured products, we look at manufacturing as
a natural proxy for the tradable sector. Second, whereas previous studies
mostly focused on the link between productivity and real exchange rates,
motivated by the HBS hypothesis, we place signi￿cant emphasis on the joint
dynamics of net trade and di⁄erent international relative prices (including
the price of tradables). Our analysis incorporates three measures of inter-
national relative prices between each country and an aggregate of OECD
economies, namely, a CPI-based, a PPI-based and an export-de￿ ator-based
real exchange rate ￿ the latter being constructed to proxy for the terms of
trade.5
Overall, our baseline VAR results square well with standard models￿pre-
3We could not include France and Canada in our analysis because of the results of unit
root tests on relevant variables ￿ see section 4.
4For instance, the quantitative model in Section 5 predicts that productivity shocks in
the nontradable sector would lead to a real exchange rate and terms of trade depreciation,
irrespective of the e⁄ects on these variables of shocks to tradables productivity. While
these results may vary across model speci￿cation, it remains true that, in general, the
overall e⁄ect of aggregate shocks on external variables is bound to depend on the relative
strength and correlation of sectoral shocks.
5As discussed in the text, we build this proxy because bilateral import and export
prices are unavailable for most countries in our sample.
2dictions on the international transmission along many dimensions: as a gen-
eral pattern, positive productivity shocks in each of the countries in our sam-
ple raise domestic manufacturing output and aggregate consumption relative
to an aggregate of other industrial countries. In response to such shocks, the
trade balance worsens, its deterioration being persistent over time; the price
of domestic tradables in terms of nontradables￿ proxied in most cases by
the PPI relative to the services CPI ￿ falls, in full accord with the HBS
hypothesis.
Most interestingly, we ￿nd that the real exchange rate￿ s response to pro-
ductivity shocks is heterogenous across countries. In the case of the US and
Japan ￿ the two largest and least open economies in our sample ￿ produc-
tivity gains lead to a short-run appreciation in all our three measures of the
international relative prices. The price response is instead not signi￿cant for
Germany, at least in our baseline speci￿cation. In the case of the UK and
Italy ￿ the smaller and more open economies in our sample ￿ we detect
permanent depreciations.
It is worth emphasizing that, while the sign of the international price
response di⁄ers across countries, in each economy all prices move in the
same direction. Namely, the response of the CPI-based real exchange rate
has the same sign as the response of the PPI-based and export-de￿ ator-
based real exchange rates (or terms of trade). Together with our ￿nding
that nontradables prices always appreciate in response to productivity shocks
to manufacturing, this result suggests that real exchange rate movements
are dominated by movements in the terms of trade (proxied by our export-
de￿ ator-based exchange rates), rather than by the HBS e⁄ect.6
We verify the robustness of our results along di⁄erent dimensions, partic-
ularly by modelling in levels (rather than ￿rst di⁄erences) all the variables
for which unit-root tests give contrasting results. For the US and Japan,
our results are unchanged under this alternative speci￿cation. However, we
detect short-run real exchange rate appreciation for Germany ￿ possibly in
line with the other large countries￿results ￿ and for the UK, while the re-
sponse of the real exchange rate becomes insigni￿cant for Italy. We also verify
6While the textbook version of the HBS hypothesis is often phrased in reference to
a real appreciation of the exchange rate, we emphasize that such version is not correct
when countries are specialized in the production of di⁄erent tradable goods. In this case,
whether or not the increase in the relative price of nontradables across countries also
transpires into an appreciation of the real exchange rate depends on the sign and relative
strength of the terms of trade movement.
3that our results are reasonably stable over di⁄erent subsamples and across
speci￿cations where one country￿ s productivity growth is not entered as a
di⁄erential with respect to the rest of the OECD economies, but in absolute
terms. Finally, using the model developed in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc
[2006], we carry out some Monte Carlo experiments to assess the perfor-
mance of our identi￿cation strategy on simulated time series data, obtaining
fairly encouraging results.
In the US and Japan, a productivity-driven macroeconomic expansion is
initially associated with stronger international prices of domestic tradables,
and a trade de￿cit. This characterization of cyclical expansions is reminis-
cent of models attributing international business cycle movements to demand
shocks ￿ such as the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (MFD) model. Speci￿-
cally, in the MFD model with ￿ exible exchange rate, a real (￿ IS￿ ) demand
boom raising output and employment, also increases imports and appreciates
the currency in real terms (hence net exports are ￿ crowded out￿ ). Overall,
consumption and output booms are associated with a stronger currency and
an external de￿cit. In the MFD theoretical framework, demand shocks are
driven by exogenous policy measures (￿scal policy) and/or exogenous swings
in the ￿ autonomous￿component of consumption and investment spending ￿
often motivated, but not modelled, in terms of changing expectations about
future income or productivity.
In dynamic general equilibrium models, however, productivity shocks do
a⁄ect relative prices and wealth, thus shaping consumption and investment
demand. Early international real business cycle models have stressed the im-
portance of intertemporal considerations for demand dynamics. For instance,
Backus et al. [1995] shows that a persistent country-speci￿c shock to pro-
ductivity in an economy with investment leads to a current account de￿cit,
as domestic agents raise their consumption with permanent income as well
as invest in domestic technologies. Recent quantitative and analytical litera-
ture on the international business cycle has increasingly recognized the need
to reconsider the dynamics of international prices as well. With incomplete
markets, it is now well understood that the response of domestic absorption
(demand) to persistent productivity shocks is driven by pronounced country-
speci￿c wealth e⁄ects. This response may be strong enough to cause a real
appreciation, at least in the short run. Our results provide an empirical
contribution to this literature.
Speci￿cally, our overall ￿ndings for the US and Japan question the trans-
mission mechanism embedded in some popular DSGE models of the inter-
4national economy. Our results suggest that price movements may magnify
the consumption risk of productivity ￿ uctuations, as countries with larger
tradable supplies also enjoy favorable terms of trade movements. By the
same token, they suggest that the sign of the international spillovers from
domestic productivity shocks be negative, at least in the short run.
To appreciate the importance of our ￿ndings for policy analysis, consider
the recent debate on the adjustment process associated with an hypothetical
reversal of the US current account. In a series of papers, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
[2004, 2005] argue that a drastic correction of the US external balance would
entail a large real depreciation of the dollar. Yet, productivity di⁄erentials in
the tradable sector between the US and the rest of the world would somewhat
smooth out the adjustment: a higher supply of tradables would improve US
net exports, via a worsening of the terms of trade, while containing the overall
rate of real depreciation via the HBS e⁄ect.
Our empirical results challenge this view in at least two respects. First,
our evidence suggests that the terms of trade movements in the short and
medium run are the opposite of what is postulated by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
[2004]: our measures of the US international price of tradables appreciate
with productivity gains in the US domestic tradable sector.7 Second, we
￿nd that, for a prolonged period of time, productivity gains do not improve
the trade balance. Once the dynamic response of absorption to productivity
gains in the traded good sector is taken into account, the short- to medium-
run e⁄ect on the US net trade is negative. By the same token, consider the
claim that productivity growth in the rest of the world would unconditionally
hamper the US external correction, unless it is concentrated in the nontraded
good sector.8 Contrary to this claim, our VAR results suggest that produc-
tivity growth in most industrial countries, especially in Japan and Europe,
is likely to raise global demand for US products in the medium run, even
when productivity gains are concentrated in the manufacturing sector. The
e⁄ect on the US trade balance would clearly be positive ￿ in accord to stan-
dard models￿predictions, that higher growth and productivity in Europe and
7This result also holds when in our US VAR model, we specify the terms of trade as
the relative price of exports in terms of overall US imports.
8￿We dispel some common misconception about what kind of shifts are needed to help
close the US current account imbalances. Faster growth abroad helps only if it is relatively
concentrated in nontradable goods; faster productivity growth in foreign tradable goods
is more likely to exacerbate the US adjustment problem.￿(Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, [2004],
abstract).
5Japan would help correcting current global imbalances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the international
transmission mechanism in standard theoretical and quantitative models,
identifying alternative views and empirical predictions. Section 3 describes
the data and the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents and analyzes in
detail our main results. Section 5 discusses whether our identi￿ed impulse
responses correctly reproduce the international transmission in Monte Carlo
experiments. Section 6 concludes, deriving policy implications. Appendix
1 describes the data in detail, Appendix 2 speci￿es the model used in the
Monte Carlo experiments in Section 5.
2 Productivity, international prices and the
current account: a theoretical perspective
A common view of the international transmission of country-speci￿c produc-
tivity growth is that a higher supply of domestic tradables is absorbed by
international markets at a lower price. In this section, we reconsider the
theoretical underpinning of such a view. Speci￿cally, we argue that the in-
ternational transmission mechanism envisaged by standard theory generates
a much richer macroeconomic and relative price dynamics. To do so, we
will initially refer to well-known general equilibrium models of the interna-
tional economy including both nontradables and country-speci￿c tradables
(e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [2000]); we will also brie￿ y discuss recent models
allowing for ￿rms￿entry and market dynamics.
2.1 The international transmission mechanism with high
consumption-risk insurance.
According to standard theory, productivity gains in the tradable sector raise
the price of non-tradables relative to tradables ￿ as predicted by HBS ￿
and change the country￿ s terms of trade. The overall response of the real
exchange rate will depend on the relative magnitude of the movements in
these prices: the HBS e⁄ect tends to appreciate the real exchange rate; if the
terms of trade worsens, this tends to depreciate it. What does the sign and
magnitude of the terms of trade response depend on?
A key role is played by the structure of international asset markets and
6the degree of international consumption insurance. When models are devel-
oped under the assumption of complete risk sharing, this assumption implies
an important restriction on terms of trade and real exchange rate movements.
As is well known, e¢ cient consumption-risk insurance implies that the ratio
of marginal utility of consumption across two countries is proportional to
the bilateral real exchange rate between these countries. In other words, do-
mestic consumption rises relative to foreign consumption only if its relative
price ￿ the real exchange rate ￿ is depreciating. To see the implications of
this condition for the international transmission mechanism, recall that posi-
tive productivity shocks to tradables increase the price of home nontradables
through the HBS e⁄ect: ceteris paribus, this leads to a real appreciation.
Thus, for domestic consumption to rise, the terms of trade must worsen
enough to more than o⁄set the nontradable price increase, causing an over-
all depreciation of the real exchange rate.9 It follows that models assuming
a high degree of consumption insurance necessarily subscribe to the con-
ventional wisdom about the international transmission mechanism as stated
above, that a higher domestic supply of tradable lowers their international
price (e.g., see Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ [2000]).
It also follows that terms of trade depreciation in response to positive
productivity shocks is predicted by models assuming incomplete markets,
yet implying allocations that are close to the ￿rst best ￿ i.e. predicting
a counterfactual positive and high correlation between relative consumption
and the real exchange rate. This is an important lesson from in￿ uential
contributions which have contrasted complete-market and incomplete-market
models, showing examples where the models are remarkably close to each
other as regards the equilibrium allocations and the transmission mechanism
(see Cole and Obstfeld [1991], Baxter and Crucini [1995] and Chari, Kehoe,
McGrattan [2002], and the discussion in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2004]).
9It is easy to verify that a similar argument goes through also in models without
nontradables, but home bias in consumption. In this case, the real exchange rate and the
terms of trade move in the same direction. Then, a productivity shock raising domestic
consumption cannot but depreciate both international prices.
72.2 The international transmission mechanism with low
consumption-risk insurance
When markets are incomplete, however, it is no longer true that relative con-
sumption can increase only in the presence of real depreciation. Productivity
gains drive a wedge between domestic and foreign wealth: if this (endoge-
nous) wedge is large, productivity shocks cause substantial asymmetric e⁄ects
on domestic demand relative to foreign demand. With large movements in
relative domestic absorption, the terms of trade response can even change
sign relative to the complete market allocation; by the same token, a rise in
relative consumption is not necessarily associated with real exchange rate de-
preciation, but can be accompanied by real appreciation ￿ consistent with
a large body of evidence after Backus and Smith [1993], Kollmann [1995]
and Ravn [2001]. With incomplete markets, the international transmission
mechanism thus depends on a key set of structural parameters, including the
persistence of shocks and trade elasticities.
2.2.1 Dynamic response to persistent shocks
Consider ￿rst the case in which productivity innovations are very persistent
and/or anticipated. The macroeconomic dynamic response to these shocks
is in part consistent with the above conventional wisdom about the interna-
tional transmission. Namely, in the long run, the terms of trade unambigu-
ously depreciate relative to the initial equilibrium, as new capital is installed
and becomes productive, and productivity is at its new, higher levels; corre-
spondingly, the trade balance improves. In the short run, however, because
of ine¢ cient consumption risk insurance, relative domestic wealth and ab-
sorption increase markedly in anticipation of future output gains. A strong
response in domestic absorption raises demand for domestic tradables rela-
tive to supply, opening a trade de￿cit. Under some conditions, the short-term
surge in absorption can actually cause an equilibrium temporary appreciation
of the terms of trade.
In related work (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2006]), we analyze the above
transmission mechanism in a standard DSGE model with traded and non-
traded goods, and internationally incomplete asset markets, in which produc-
tivity shocks, though falling short of having a unit root, are somehow more
persistent than what it is usually assumed in business cycle models. We show
that the model can indeed generate terms of trade and real exchange rate
8appreciation in response to those very persistent productivity shocks to trad-
ables, under the following conditions. First, the economy has a su¢ ciently
high degree of home bias in absorption ￿ calibrated in line with the US
economy ￿ so that the response in spending to a shock raising wealth falls
to a large extent on domestically produced goods (the economy is relatively
closed to trade). Second, the long-run price elasticity of domestic tradables
is relatively high ￿ close to the (mainly panel) estimates by trade econo-
mists, see e.g. Eaton and Kortum [2002] or Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan
Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum [2003]. This is because the
higher the price elasticity, the smaller the long-run fall in the international
price of domestic goods required to accommodate an increase in their supply.
With a high elasticity, the e⁄ects of adverse relative price movements on the
international value of domestic output and domestic wealth are contained.
Third, agents can only borrow and lend in international markets.
Under these conditions, standard DSGE open economy models predict
that the dynamic response of the terms of trade to long-lasting productivity
innovations consists in short-run appreciation, followed by depreciation in
the long run. Observe that terms of trade spillovers are positive in the long
run, but negative in the short run, when the upsurge in domestic absorption
driven by expectations of future productivity gains (and ￿nanced in interna-
tional capital markets) raises the international price of domestic tradables,
hurting foreign consumers. These results obtain by assuming shocks that are
very persistent yet stationary. A fortiori, similar results obtain if shocks are
permanent, or are anticipated, as shown in our Monte Carlo experiments in
Section 5.
2.2.2 The role of price elasticities
A variety of aggregate time-series estimates pick up a very low price elasticity
of imports (e.g., see Hooper et al. [1995]). Combined with a realistic degree
of home bias in absorption, a low price elasticity of imports has important
general equilibrium implications. Namely, wealth e⁄ects from terms of trade
movements can be so strong that productivity gains raise, rather than low-
ering, the international price of a country￿ s tradable output. An intuitive
explanation (discussed at length in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2004]) is as
follows. Provided that domestic consumers and ￿rms are the largest buyers
of domestic goods (home bias is strong), an increase in the global demand for
these goods is possible only if domestic private income and absorption rise
9enough. A fall in the terms of trade however tends to reduce domestic wealth
and income, as the selling price of domestic tradables determines the value of
domestic output. If income e⁄ects are strong enough relative to substitution
e⁄ects because of a low price elasticity, a terms of trade deterioration would
cause a shortfall in the global demand for domestic goods. Then, an increase
in domestic supply must be associated with an equilibrium appreciation in
the terms of trade.
Di⁄erent from the analysis in the previous subsection, if the elasticity
remains su¢ ciently low in the long run, the response of the terms of trade
needs not change sign over time ￿ i.e. there is no long-run depreciation. The
terms of trade appreciate and domestic absorption booms on impact, opening
a real and nominal trade de￿cit (if the appreciation is not too large). Welfare
implications are starker. With a low elasticity, spillovers are unambiguously
negative at all time horizons, and for any degree of shock persistence. Strong
wealth e⁄ects imply that a country can capture most of the domestic gains
in productivity in both the short and the long run, independently of the
possibility of intertemporal trade. In contrast, with high elasticity and per-
sistent shocks, terms of trade movements tend to create positive (albeit small)
spillovers in the long run.
2.3 Adjustment at the extensive margin
Further doubts on the common view of international transmission of technol-
ogy shocks are raised by the recent macroeconomic literature on ￿rm dynam-
ics and endogenous goods variety, which allows for ￿rms￿adjustment at both
the intensive margin (i.e., changing the scale of production of a given set of
goods) and the extensive margin (i.e., via the introduction of new goods).10
If the ￿rms in a country take advantage of technological progress changing
the attributes of the goods they produce ￿ the argument goes ￿ productiv-
ity gains are not necessarily associated with a fall in the international price
of their output.
Developments of this idea developed in a general equilibrium setting can
be found in recent papers studying economies where goods variety varies
endogenously in response to shocks. Speci￿cally, the international business
cycle model by Ghironi and Melitz [2005] predicts that the terms of trade
10A theoretical attempt to build a model encompassing a discussion of both elasticities
and creation of new goods is provided by Ruhl [2003].
10appreciate in response to an increase in (labor) productivity ￿ which reduces
symmetrically both the marginal costs of producing goods, and the sunk cost
of setting up new ￿rms. Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti [2005] shows that, under
incomplete markets, the terms of trade appreciate in response to productivity
gains reducing entry costs, but depreciate if technology innovations make
good manufacturing cheaper. Cross-country evidence consistent with these
e⁄ects is provided by Acemoglu and Ventura [2003] as well as by Debaere
and Lee [2004].11
A policy-relevant issue raised by this class of model is that, when the
supply of goods varieties is endogenous, international spillovers depend not
only on the movements of the terms of trade (an appreciation hurts foreign
consumers), but also on the welfare implications of a changing array of goods
available to consumers (an increase in varieties bene￿ts foreign consumers).
International welfare e⁄ects are not directly related to relative price move-
ments: if the consumers￿love for goods variety is high enough, international
spillovers of productivity shocks may be positive even when the terms of
trade move against the Foreign country.
3 Estimating the e⁄ects of a permanent tech-
nology shock to manufacturing
In this section, we present our strategy for identifying the e⁄ects of perma-
nent shocks to technology in the manufacturing sector for the US, Japan,
Germany, the UK, and Italy vis-￿-vis an aggregate of the other G7 countries
and three other OECD countries (Australia, Sweden and Ireland) for which
we were able to obtain quarterly data on hourly labor productivity. We fo-
cus on time series evidence and use VAR methods, extending work by Gal￿
[1999], Francis and Ramey [2003] and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
[2004] ￿ where technology shocks are identi￿ed via long-run restrictions ￿
to an open-economy context. Namely, we adopt the identifying assumption
that the only type of shock which a⁄ects the long-run level of average la-
bor productivity in manufacturing is a permanent shock to technology. Our
work is thus related to a number of recent contributions which have investi-
11Also in this class of models the intensity as well as the direction of international price
movements depend on the degree of international consumption risk sharing ￿ as well as
on the elasticity of labor supply (see Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti [2005]).
11gated the e⁄ects of technology shocks identi￿ed using long-run restrictions in
a closed-economy framework. This literature uses the basic insight from the
stochastic growth model, that only technology shocks should have a perma-
nent e⁄ect on labor productivity, to identify economy-wide technology shocks
in the data.12
As discussed below, we use reduced-form time series methods in conjunc-
tion with our identifying assumption to estimate the e⁄ects of a permanent
shock to technology. As argued by Christiano Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
[2004], an advantage of this approach is that we do not need to resort to
the set of assumptions usually required to construct measures of technology
shocks based on Solow residuals, including corrections for labor hoarding,
capital utilization, and time-varying markups.13 On the other hand, we are
fully aware that there exist models in which our identifying assumption may
not be veri￿ed. An obvious instance is the case of endogenous growth models
where all shocks a⁄ect productivity in the long run. Another possibility is
that of an otherwise standard two-sector model, when there are permanent
shocks in both the manufacturing and the other (nontradable goods) sector.
To be as sure as possible that we have actually identi￿ed technology shocks
in the manufacturing sector, our baseline speci￿cation includes the relative
price of manufactured goods in terms of consumer services, as a proxy for
the relative price of domestic tradables in terms of nontradables. This price
should fall in response to a technology shock which is speci￿c to the tradable
sector.14
12See Shapiro and Watson [1988], among others. Some open-economy papers, following
Blanchard and Quah [1989], use long-run restrictions derived in the context of the tradi-
tional aggregate demand and aggregate supply framework. For instance, Clarida and Gal￿
[1994] identify supply shocks by assuming that demand and monetary shocks do not have
long-run e⁄ects on relative output levels across countries. While monetary shocks satisfy
this assumption in most models, ￿scal or preference shocks do not, since they can have
long-run e⁄ects on output (and hours) in the stochastic growth model. A survey of the
closed economy literature using long-run restrictions is Gal￿ and Rabanal [2005].
13This is the approach followed by Basu, Fernald and Kimball [2006]. For yet another
alternative based on sign restrictions, see Dedola and Neri [2004].
14In Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2004] we used (annual) TFP data for the US obtaining
very similar results to those reported below. As argued by Chang and Hong [2002], the use
of TFP provides a further check on the identi￿cation strategy, as it amounts to controlling
for long-run e⁄ects on labor productivity brought about by changes in the long-run capital
labor ratio by other permanent shocks, e.g. capital tax-rate shocks (see Uhlig [2003]).
Unfortunately, we could not extend the analysis in Corsetti et al [2004] to the other
countries because of lack of data on sectoral TFP.
12We examine the e⁄ects of technology shocks to the manufacturing sector
(our proxy for traded goods), identi￿ed with long run restrictions, on the
real exchange rate, the terms of trade, net exports and relative consumption
and output ￿ we leave a detailed description of the data sources to the data
appendix. Over the period 1973 to 2004, we estimate several speci￿cations
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Here xj;t denotes the variable that is assumed to respond in the long run
exclusively to permanent technology shocks: in all our speci￿cations, this
variable is the (log of the) quarterly labor productivity in manufacturing,
measured in deviation from quarterly labor productivity in manufacturing in
the "rest of the world" (hereafter ROW). All ROW￿ s variables are speci￿c
to country j and built as an aggregate of a large sample of other countries
(excluding country j) weighted according to their respective (time-varying)
GDP shares at PPP values.15 This set of countries comprises six of the
G7 countries (thus including Canada and France), plus Australia, Ireland
and Sweden.16 The vector yj;t is 5x1 and always includes (the log of) a
country-speci￿c index of manufacturing production and aggregate consump-
tion relative to the same variable for the ROW, the country￿ s ratio of nominal
net export over GDP and (the log of) the relative domestic producer price
index over the domestic consumer price index (of services, when available)







where the price indexes Pi and P ￿
i are alternatively (the log) of the CPI, PPI
and export-de￿ ator, and SP ￿
i is also built as a PPP GDP-weighted aggregate
of the countries included in ROW.17
15We use GDP shares as trade weights were not available for all countries going back to
1970.
16These 10 countries add up to roughly half of world GDP at PPP values, so they
represent a substantial sample of the global economy. Moreover, trade ￿ ows among them
also amount to over a half of their respective total trade, on average. For instance, the
US trade share with the other 9 countries in our sample is around 60 percent of US total
trade.
17This is meant to capture the following well-known decomposition of the CPI-based
13Finally, C (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator; "z
jt denotes the technol-
ogy shock to manufacturing speci￿c to country j, and "m
jt the other structural,
non-technology shocks. Although not necessary for identi￿cation, implicit in
our benchmark speci￿cation is the assumption that all the variables other
than productivity also have a unit root. Lacking any strong theoretical a-
priori on the stationarity of the variables included in the VARs, we resorted
to standard unit root tests. In our sample, the assumption of nonstation-
arity is consistently not rejected in the data, but for Japanese net exports
￿ tests￿results are shown in Tables A1 through A5.18 However, following
the suggestions in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2004], whenever
there is some evidence against a unit root, we also estimate speci￿cations of
the VARs with the corresponding variable (such as the real exchange rates
or net exports) in levels, rather than growth rates.
Together with the usual assumption that the structural shocks "t are
uncorrelated and have unitary variance, positing that Cxm (1) = 0 is enough
to identify "z
t. This restricts the unit root in the variable xt to originate solely
in the technology shock. In practice, in order to estimate impulse responses
to the technology shock we follow the Bayesian approach for just-identi￿ed
systems discussed in Doan [1992]. For each country, we begin by estimating
the following 4th-order reduced form VAR:
Zj;t = ￿ + Bj (L)Zj;t￿1 + uj;t;Euj;tu
0






, and ut is the one-step-ahead forecast error in Zj;t.
Also, ￿j is a positive de￿nite matrix. It is well-known that positing a non
informative prior of the Normal-Wishart family and a Gaussian likelihood
implies that the posterior for parameters of the reduced form VAR above is
also Normal-Wishart (see Uhlig [2001] for a formal derivation), whose para-
meters including ￿ can be estimated by OLS applied to each equation. The
real exchange rate between a ￿rst component due to the relative price of tradables across
countries, and a second component due to the relative price of tradables in terms of



















18We run both the Phillips and Perron [1988] and Elliot, Rothenberg, Stock [1996] GLS-
modi￿ed Dickey-Fuller tests, allowing the level of variables to have alternatively a constant
term or also a deterministic trend.
14structural economic shocks, "jt, are related to ujt by the following relation






As in (1), without loss of generality, we suppose that "z
t is the ￿rst element
of "t, and B(L) = A
￿1
0 C(L)￿1: The assumption that Cxm (1) = 0 implies that
the ￿rst column of A
￿1
0 ; depicting the e⁄ects of a technology shock on the
variables in the VAR, is uniquely de￿ned by:
A
￿1





￿1 ￿ e B (1)
￿10￿i￿1
; e B (1) = [I ￿ B (1)]:
Therefore, for each draw from the known posterior of the reduced-form VAR
we can compute a unique A
￿1
0 and the associated impulse responses.19
4 The international transmission of perma-
nent productivity shocks to tradables pro-
duction
In this and the next section, we report our results for ￿ve G7 countries
(US, Japan, Germany, UK, Italy) in our sample. Our data are displayed in
appendix 1, Figures A1-A5. We consider the sample period 1973-2004, corre-
sponding to the international monetary system after the collapse of Bretton
Woods (and the longest period for which we have data). While we initially
included all the G7 countries in our analysis, we were forced to drop France
and Canada from the analysis because for these countries unit-root tests re-
jected the hypothesis of nonstationarity in the measure of labor productivity
di⁄erential with the ROW.20 In what follows, we report results based on
our baseline speci￿cation, in which all variables are in growth rates. In the
following subsection, we will conduct sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Baseline speci￿cation
Figures 1 through 5 display the impulse response functions for our baseline
di⁄erence speci￿cation, along with 68 percent pointwise posterior con￿dence
19Results below are based on 1000 draws.
20Precisely, in the case of France (Canada) both the Phillips-Perron and the GLS Dickey-
Fuller tests rejected the null of nonstationarity at the 1 (10) percent con￿dence level.
15intervals. For instance, Figure 1 displays the response of US relative produc-
tivity, manufacturing output (Y-Y*), and aggregate consumption (C-C*),
all in log di⁄erential with ROW, along with nominal net trade over GDP
(NX/Y), the PPI relative to the services CPI, and our three alternative in-
ternational relative prices (RER), based on the CPI, the PPI and the export
de￿ ator. Each ￿gure shows the OLS estimates (the black solid line), the me-
dian (the red solid line) and the 16th and 84th percentiles (the blue dashed
lines) of the posterior distribution.
Starting with the US, our main results are as follows. First, the median
impact e⁄ect of the shock on relative manufacturing output and aggregate
consumption is slightly negative but statistically insigni￿cant in the short
run; both variables however converge to a permanently higher level after
three years. Second, the long-run increase in both these variables is of the
order of 0.5 percent, against a permanent increase of 1.5 percent in the pro-
ductivity di⁄erential. Note that the rise in relative consumption and produc-
tivity are estimated with higher precision than the rise in output. Third, the
technology shock leads to a prolonged, statistically signi￿cant fall in both net
exports and the relative price of domestic tradables. The latter corresponds
to a Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect, according to the conventional wisdom about
the relative price implications of productivity gains in manufacturing. Note
that this result provides some support to the identi￿cation scheme under-
lying our analysis, against the possibility of productivity innovations more
concentrated in others sectors (which are less likely to cause a signi￿cant
increase in the price of nontradables).21
The fall in net export may be surprising, in light of some applied and
policy literature postulating that a productivity increase in tradables should
bring about an improvement in net trade. Against this presumption, our
empirical results suggest that the deterioration in net trade peaks after about
three years, standing at roughly 0.15 percentage points of nominal GDP,
and persist in the long-run. While this very persistent e⁄ect re￿ ects the
assumption ￿ strongly supported by unit root tests ￿ that the net-trade-
to-GDP ratio is nonstationary, it is by no means a mechanical implication of
that assumption.22
21Moreover, if our identi￿cation scheme was picking just an (o⁄setting) measurement
error in manufacturing labor productivity and the PPI, it would be quite far-fetched that
this measurement error be also positively correlated with very persistent increase in relative
aggregate consumption and deterioration of net exports.
22See Engel and Rogers [2005] for further evidence on the nonstationary behavior of US
16Fourth, the CPI-based RER temporarily appreciates (an increase is an
appreciation) in the aftermath of the shock, and then goes back to its previous
long-run level. Notably, together with the response of relative consumption,
the response of the CPI-based RER is at odds with the condition for e¢ cient
consumption risk sharing ￿ but consistent with the evidence in Backus and
Smith [1993]. Finally, the other two measures of international relative prices
display the same pattern as the CPI-based RER. As these two measures are
built using PPIs (i.e. price indexes including a larger share of tradables than
the CPI) and export de￿ ators (including only the price of traded goods), our
results suggest that the RER appreciation re￿ ects more than the classical
Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect: it also captures important terms of trade e⁄ects,
as well as deviations from the law of one price (LOP) for manufacturing
goods.
In Figures 2 through 5, we report the same set of impulse responses for
Japan, Germany, the UK and Italy, respectively. Relative to the US, these
countries display similar patterns overall, but also some important di⁄er-
ences. For all countries, a positive shock increases the consumption di⁄eren-
tial after a few quarters; it decreases both the nominal net trade relative to
GDP as well as the relative price of manufacturing in terms of services/overall
CPI ￿ with the exception of Japan, where the latter variable initially rises,
albeit insigni￿cantly. The initial positive response of relative manufacturing
output translates into a permanent increase in Japan, the UK and Italy, but
it is signi￿cant only in Japan, where it levels o⁄ at around 1.5 percent. Rel-
ative output instead displays a permanent and signi￿cant fall in Germany.23
Conversely, relative consumption increases permanently in all four countries
by around 0.5 percent, albeit insigni￿cantly in Japan. The deterioration of
net exports over GDP is stronger in the UK and Germany, where it is also
permanent; in Italy this variable displays a similar qualitative behavior but
net trade.
23This result for Germany does not sit well with the assumption that the identi￿ed
shock is a positive technology shock, although in principle it could be consistent with it
in the presence of large positive wealth e⁄ects on domestic labor supply and/or strong
complementarity between tradables and nontradables. However, alternative interpreta-
tions run into even more serious problems. Similarly to the case of a measurement error in
labor productivity discussed above, attributing the estimated responses to an increase in
labor taxes would be consistent with the output drop which accompanies the productivity
increase, but could hardly be reconciled with the positive wealth e⁄ect implied by the
response of both consumption and net exports. Moreover, such interpretation would also
be at odds with the large fall in the domestic relative price of manufactured goods.
17is signi￿cantly negative only for a couple of quarters one year after the shock.
As in the US case, these permanent e⁄ects re￿ ect the assumption that the
net-trade-to-GDP ratio is nonstationary, in line with results from unit root
tests. In Japan net exports ￿ modelled as stationary ￿ reach a minimum
8-10 quarters after the shock, and then slowly revert to their baseline value.
Finally the relative price of manufactured goods in terms of services falls
permanently in all countries, although signi￿cantly so only in Germany and
Italy.
Strikingly di⁄erent patterns emerge as regards international pricing. As
for the US, also in Japan all measures of international relative prices, in-
cluding the CPI-based RER, signi￿cantly appreciate in the ￿rst few quarters
after the shock. Conversely, international relative prices depreciate perma-
nently in the case of Italy and the UK ￿ for these countries, our results are
close to the conventional view of the international transmission mechanism.
The response of international prices is small and insigni￿cant in the case of
Germany. Note that, as for the US, in each country in our sample, our three
measures of relative prices display the same behavior despite the di⁄erent
weights of tradable goods in the corresponding price indexes. This result
lends support to the hypothesis that terms-of-trade movements and devia-
tions from the law of one price play a crucial role in driving the CPI-based
real exchange rate dynamics in the aftermath of the productivity shock.
Our baseline results on the international transmission of productivity
shocks to manufacturing can be summarized as follows. First, we ￿nd that
a positive shock leads to an increase of domestic consumption above foreign
consumption, and worsens the trade balance.
Second, with the exception of Japan, where this e⁄ect turns out to be in-
signi￿cant, productivity gains in manufacturing lower the PPI relative to the
(services) CPI. As the latter index includes a much larger share of nontraded
goods, this is evidence in support of the HBS hypothesis: in response to
sector-speci￿c productivity gains, nontraded good prices appreciate relative
to tradables.
Third, the real exchange rate response is heterogenous across countries.
However, in each individual country our three measures of the real exchange
rate move in very similar ways ￿ despite the di⁄erent degree of tradability
of the goods included in the corresponding price indexes (CPI, PPI or export
de￿ ator). In the case of the US and Japan ￿ the two largest and least open
countries in our sample ￿ productivity gains lead to a short-run appreciation
in all our measures of the real exchange rate. In our baseline speci￿cation,
18the response is instead not signi￿cant for Germany. In the case of the UK and
Italy ￿ the smaller and more open economies in our sample ￿ , we detect
permanent depreciations. So, while we ￿nd evidence of a Balassa-Samuelson
increase in the domestic relative price of nontradables in all countries, the
CPI-based real exchange rate seem to be driven by a country￿ s terms of trade,
as proxied by our export-de￿ ator based real exchange rate.24
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the sensitivity of our analysis along three
dimensions. First, we allow some variables to enter the VAR speci￿cations in
levels, possibly with deterministic trends; second we verify subsample stabil-
ity; third, we re-estimate the VAR models with labor productivity growth in
each country, not measured in deviations from ￿ ROW￿ . Robustness along a
further dimension, the choice of variables included in the VARs, was obtained
in part as a by-product of the above analysis (e.g. including a di⁄erent in-
ternational relative price ￿ the PPI- instead of the CPI based real exchange
rate); in part through alternative speci￿cations of the model. These alter-
native speci￿cations did not have any signi￿cant impact on our results ￿ to
save space we do not report them in the text.25
24In his comments, Susanto Basu presents evidence on the response of the US real
exchange rate and net exports to a shock to productivity using the productivity measure
carefully constructed by Basu et al. [2006], which refers to the US economy as a whole.
According to these results, the real exchange rate tends to depreciate, and net exports to
improve (although not signi￿cantly so) in response to a positive productivity shock. In
our view, this is a very interesting result, which points to the importance of distinguishing
between productivity dynamics in di⁄erent sectors of the economy, and being precise
about spillovers and correlation across sectors. Indeed, our theoretical model presented
in Section 5 predicts that productivity shocks in the nontradable sector have exactly the
dynamic e⁄ects shown by Basu ￿ irrespective of the response to tradables productivity
shocks. Basu￿ s ￿ndings are not necessarily in contradiction with our evidence, to the
extent that the measure of productivity used in Basu￿ s analysis predominantly captures
shock dynamics in the nontraded good sector.
25We estimated speci￿cations of the model including other domestic and international
variables, like total and non-residential investment, and aggregate GDP, obtaining broadly
similar results to those discussed in the text. More robustness exercises are provided by
Robert Kollmann in his comments. Although his discussion emphasizes a few cases in
which results di⁄er from those presented here, we view his ￿ndings as generally con￿rming
ours. Mostly, divergences come from simple bivariate speci￿cations of the VAR model
including only productivity and one relative price, and from VAR speci￿cations where key
variables in our speci￿cation, such as relative consumption and net exports, are dropped
194.2.1 Results with level speci￿cations
It is well-known that VAR￿ s with long-run restrictions may be sensitive to
mistakenly modelling stationary series as nonstationary because of the ensu-
ing speci￿cation error due to overdi⁄erencing (see Christiano et al. [2004]).
Since unit-root tests yield con￿ icting results regarding the nonstationarity
of some of our series, we run additional VARs with these variables in levels,
detrending them when appropriate. Note that, by construction, this entails a
zero long-run response of these variables. Speci￿cally, our unit root tests give
con￿ icting results for at least one measure of international relative prices in
all countries, and for net exports over GDP in the case of the UK and Italy.
This latter variable is stationary in Japan and nonstationary in the US and
Germany according to all tests considered.26
The results of our sensitivity analysis are reported in Figures 6 through
10 with the same variables￿mnemonics and format as before. Namely, each
￿gure shows the OLS estimates (the black solid line), the median (the red
solid line) and the 16th and 84th percentiles (the blue dashed lines) of the
pointwise posterior distribution. For the case of US and Japan, Figures 6
and 7 make it clear that our baseline results are not sensitive to alternative
assumptions about the stationarity of international relative prices. In these
￿gures we assume that all our measures of international prices are stationary
around a deterministic trend: as in the case of Figures 1 and 2, all these rel-
ative prices appreciate signi￿cantly in the short run in response to a positive
technology shock.
However, some baseline results turn out to be sensitive to the level spec-
i￿cation for Germany, the UK, and Italy. Although the responses of con-
sumption and output di⁄erentials, as well as that of the relative price of
nontradables are generally unchanged, we detect di⁄erences in the behavior
of international relative prices. Figures 8 and 9 show that all measures of
international relative prices markedly appreciate in the short run in the case
of Germany and the UK. Conversely, the responses of international relative
(to be replaced by other variables, such as the CPI and government spending). These
results are not surprising, in light of the classic argument ￿ recently reiterated by Watson
[2006] ￿ that in order to recover structural shocks, VARs should include good instruments,
that is, variables that are likely to be highly a⁄ected by these shocks.
26For these latter two variables, besides the Phillips-Perron and GLS Dickey-Fuller tests,
we also run KPSS tests (see Kwiatkowski et al., [1992]). The null of stationarity was
rejected at least at the 5 percent level, even when we included a deterministic trend in the
variables￿level speci￿cation.
20prices in Italy ￿ shown in Figure 10 ￿ turn out to be small and not signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent from zero. Finally, modelling net exports in levels for the UK
(Figure 9) or Italy (Figure 10) does not change the sign of their responses,
as they continue to deteriorate after a few quarters, albeit not signi￿cantly.27
These results robustly suggest that the international transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks is at odds with the conventional wisdom ￿ that higher
supply leads to terms of trade depreciation ￿ in the cases of the US and
Japan. This conventional wisdom is instead veri￿ed for Italy ￿ although
the response of the international prices and net exports may be small. For
Germany and the UK, results vary depending on the assumptions about
stationarity of the real exchange rate.
4.2.2 Subsample stability
In this subsection we brie￿ y discuss subsample stability, focusing on the
benchmark speci￿cation. Stock and Watson [2005], among others, have ar-
gued that the world economy has become less volatile after the 1970s ￿
the ￿great moderation￿￿ and that this resulted in a structural change in
VAR￿ s. Moreover, one can observe that the ￿rst years in our sample were
characterized by the transition from the Bretton-Woods regime of ￿xed ex-
change rates, to the current regime of ￿ oating rates. Finally, the beginning
of the 21st century has witnessed several changes in the global economy, with
the rapid growth of large emerging market countries such as China and India,
the launch of the European common currency, and the emergence of large
current account imbalances across the world. This subsection assesses the
robustness of our conclusions to the possibility of subsample instability due
to these changes.
Panels A and B of Figure 11 ￿ referred to the US ￿display the estimated
impulse responses of the variables in our baseline system, for the pre-1999Q1
and post-1978Q4 sample periods, respectively. As before, each ￿gure shows
the OLS estimates (the black solid line), the median (the red solid line)
and the 16th and 84th percentiles (the blue dashed lines) of the pointwise
distribution in the indicated subsample. To save on space, we do not show
the results for the other countries, as these substantially con￿rm our ￿ndings
27We also run a speci￿cation for Germany with also the detrended consumption di⁄er-
ential in level, given that the Phillips-Perron test without a constant rejected a unit root
in this variable at the 5 percent level. Since results are very similar to those displayed in
Figure 8 we do not report them in this version of the paper.
21for the US.
The key results are as follows. First, the qualitative patterns of all vari-
ables responses are broadly similar across periods, and in full accord to our
estimates for the full sample. The US net exports deteriorate persistently
and international relative prices appreciate on impact in both subsamples.
Second, both the median and OLS estimates for each sample period would
lie well within the 68 percent con￿dence intervals in the full sample. This is
consistent with the view that the responses in the subperiods are the same
as they are for the full sample. However, the estimated e⁄ects of technology
appear somehow less signi￿cant, perhaps due to the loss of degrees of free-
dom entailed by reducing the number of observations. Overall, this evidence
is consistent with the view that the responses in the subperiods are the same
as they are for the full sample and there is no break in the international
transmission of tradable technology shocks.
4.2.3 Absolute vs relative productivity shocks
We conclude this section by brie￿ y discussing what happens if we identify
permanent shocks to the absolute level of a country￿ s labor productivity,
rather than to its productivity di⁄erential relative to the rest of the world.28
The important di⁄erence is that the former shock can di⁄use to productivity
levels in other countries in the long-run. We do so despite our empirical ￿nd-
ings that labor productivity di⁄erentials are non-stationary ￿ a result in line
with the Ricardian idea of perfect specialization in tradables entertained in
most standard DSGE open-economy models. These ￿ndings notwithstand-
ing, it could be argued that technological di⁄usion should bring all countries
on the same production frontier in the long run. If this view is correct,
long-run di⁄erentials in measured productivity should be attributed to fac-
tors other than technology, e.g. taxes. In this respect, it is worth noting
that the closed economy literature from which we borrow our identi￿cation
strategy is concerned only with shocks a⁄ecting the absolute level of produc-
tivity in a speci￿c country. In what follows, we assess the robustness of our
conclusions to the possibility of misspeci￿cation due to de￿ning productivity
in deviations from other countries.
Figure 12 ￿ referred to the US ￿displays the estimated impulse responses
of the variables in our system in ￿rst di⁄erences, where the only departure
28We thank our discussant Susanto Basu for suggesting to pursue this robustness check.
22from our baseline speci￿cation above is that labor productivity in the rest
of the world is not subtracted from its US counterpart. In accord with the
international focus of our analysis, the other variables are de￿ned exactly as
before. As in the previous ￿gures, each chart shows the OLS estimates (the
black solid line), the median (the red solid line) and the 16th and 84th per-
centiles (the blue dashed lines) of the pointwise distribution in the subsample.
As the results for all the other countries substantially con￿rm our ￿ndings
for the US, to save on space, we only show the results for this country.
The key results are as follows. First, the qualitative and quantitative pat-
terns of all variables responses are in full accord with our baseline estimates
in Figure 1. Relative output and consumption display a permanent increase,
while US net exports deteriorate persistently and international relative prices
signi￿cantly appreciate in the ￿rst few quarters; the PPI falls permanently in
terms of CPI services. Second, both the median and OLS estimates would lie
well within the 68 percent con￿dence intervals in the baseline speci￿cation
in Figure 1. This is consistent with the view that the responses are the same
as for the speci￿cations with productivity di⁄erentials, and that we are truly
identifying shocks that permanently a⁄ect US productivity both in absolute
level and relative to the rest of the world.29
5 Do identi￿ed impulse responses correctly
reproduce the international transmission?
In this section we examine whether our identi￿cation strategy is able to
detect the true e⁄ect of a positive technology shock on the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate, when this e⁄ect can be either an appreciation or
a depreciation. We pursue this goal by drawing on recent VAR literature,
whose aim is to assess the ability of a given set of identifying restrictions
29For the US, we also estimated a system with quantity variables not in deviations
from the rest of the world, and terms of trade and real exchange rates de￿ned vis-￿-vis
a broader set of countries, from the OECD Economic Outlook database. Again we ￿nd
broadly similar results to those reported in Figure 12.
In addition, our ￿ndings are further corroborated by Bems, Dedola and Smets [2006]
￿ who also ￿nd that, in line with the predictions in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1995],
shocks that permanently increase US labor productivity in the overall business sector bring
about a deterioration of net trade ￿ and by Enders a Mueller [2006] ￿ who in addition
￿nd that these shocks appreciate both the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.
23to recover the true impulse responses when applied to data simulated using
stochastic general equilibrium models.30 In line with this literature we run
the following experiment. First, we simulate time series from a standard
DSGE model with traded and non-traded goods similar to that of Stockman
and Tesar [1995], except that we assume incomplete asset markets. Second,
for each realized set of time series, we estimate a reduced form VAR with 4
lags with the same variables as in our baseline speci￿cation in Section 4, and
apply the identi￿cation scheme described in Section 3 above to estimate the
e⁄ects of technology shocks.
We emphasize that the aim of our exercise is not to provide a broad assess-
ment of the general properties of long-run restrictions with simulated data
from models which are estimated from actual macroeconomic data ￿ thus
giving a complete description of the latter (see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Vigfusson [2006]). Such an ambitious goal is clearly beyond the scope
of this paper. More modestly, we ask whether the set of model￿ s conditional
moments (impulse responses) computed by applying VARs with long-run re-
strictions to simulated data does a good job in detecting di⁄erent patterns
of the international transmission, when simulated data are produced by cal-
ibrated open-economy models which satisfy our identifying assumption ￿
that labor productivity in manufacturing has a unit root because of a non-
stationary technology shock. In particular, we ask whether the VARs￿im-
pulse responses change in the same way as the theoretical impulse responses
across models entailing di⁄erent transmission mechanisms. This is a prereq-
uisite for impulse responses from identi￿ed VARs from the data to be useful
in providing guidance in choosing across di⁄erent open-economy models.
The arti￿cial economies we use are characterized by home bias in do-
mestic spending on tradables and by the presence of distribution services
produced with the intensive use of local inputs; our models therefore gen-
erates realistic departures from purchasing power parity. We describe the
main building blocks of the model in Appendix 2; a more detailed analy-
sis of the model￿ s properties can be found in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc
[2006]. As discussed in Section 2, the international transmission of produc-
tivity shocks to tradables ￿ especially the response of the terms of trade and
the exchange rates ￿ can vary signi￿cantly, depending on shock persistence
30See, among others, Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust [2003], Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
[2004], Giannone, Reichlin and Sala [2006], and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
[2006].
24and price elasticities. To be consistent with our identi￿cation procedure, we
assume that productivity shocks to tradables follow a unit root process in
all our experiments. We then simulate our model under two alternative pa-
rameterizations of the trade elasticities, giving rise to di⁄erent transmission
mechanisms of technology shocks to tradables. Namely we set the trade elas-
ticity equal to 1 and 4, respectively. The value of 1 entails a transmission
consistent with the conventional view described in Section 2.1, and is quite
common in contributions subscribing to that view (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
[2000]). The second, higher value for the trade elasticity, equal to 4, is in line
with the estimates typically used by international trade studies; with this
value the international transmission follows the pattern described in Section
2.2.1. The values of all the other parameters of the model are constant across
experiments; Appendix 2 describes the model￿ s calibration in detail. In or-
der to avoid stochastic singularity problems when estimating the VARs, in
the simulations we add other shocks hitting the economy, namely persistent
shocks to productivity in the nontradable sector in each country and taste
shocks to the utility function, as in Stockman and Tesar [1995]. All shocks￿
innovations have the same standard deviation, set to 0.7 percent.
We simulate 100 datasets of 128 time periods for our two alternative pa-
rameterizations. As in our empirical VARs, each simulated dataset includes
the following variables: relative labor productivity and output in the trad-
able sector, aggregate relative consumption (all in log di⁄erential with ROW,
namely the other country), along with net trade over GDP and the relative
price of tradables over nontradables, and the terms of trade (the relative
price of exports in terms of imports).
Figures 13 and 14 report the result from applying long-run restrictions
to simulated data from the economy with trade elasticity equal to 4 and
1, respectively. In each chart, we report the theoretical response (the red
line) and the average response estimated by the VAR across all simulations
(the black line). Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson [2006],
we also report two sets of con￿dence intervals. The ￿rst interval, represented
by the dotted green lines, denotes the true degree of sampling uncertainty,
measured by a 68 percent error band around the estimated impulse response
functions across the 100 simulated datasets. The second con￿dence interval,
corresponding to the dotted blue lines, is computed by estimating the VAR
and computing con￿dence intervals for each simulated dataset using the pro-
cedure described in Section 3, and then averaging the upper and lower bands
over these 100 simulations.
25Consider ￿rst the theoretical responses ￿ the solid red lines ￿ under the
alternative parameterizations. In both parameterizations, a productivity im-
provement in the tradable sector leads to a rise in relative labor productivity,
relative output, and relative consumption, to a fall in the relative price of
tradables to nontradables, and to a deterioration of net exports. However, the
response of international relative prices di⁄er noticeably across experiments.
Because a permanent productivity shock induces sizeable wealth e⁄ects that
raise Home demand for domestic products, the terms of trade persistently
appreciate following the shock when the price elasticity is relatively high
(Figure 13) ￿ the real exchange rate, not reported in the ￿gure, moves to-
gether with the terms of trade. Conversely, international prices depreciate
on impact when the price elasticity is set to 1 (Figure 14).
Turning to the estimated impulse responses, it is clear that our identi￿-
cation procedure captures fairly well the qualitative features of the di⁄erent
transmission mechanisms. In both parameterizations, the estimated impulse
responses uncover the correct sign of each variable￿ s response; the VAR av-
erage impulse response is in most cases close to the true impulse response.
In both experiments, the VAR correctly predicts a permanent increase in
relative labor productivity, relative output, and relative consumption. More
strikingly, the VAR distinguishes to a large extent the di⁄erences in the
transmission mechanism across experiments. It correctly uncovers an appre-
ciation (depreciation) of the terms of trade in Figure 13 (Figure 14). Notably,
in the case of the high trade elasticity, it detects that the appreciation of the
terms of trade is persistent but not permanent. However, the VAR has some
di¢ culty uncovering with precision the theoretical response of the relative
price of nontradables. For this variable, the VAR displays some bias toward
zero ￿ this being the only instance in which the true impulse response falls
outside of the estimated con￿dence bands. Finally, note that, as apparent
from Figures 13 and 14, the procedure adopted in Section 3 to compute con-
￿dence bands (corresponding to the dotted blue lines), is fairly conservative
￿ as it typically encompasses the true degree of sampling uncertainty (cor-
responding to the dotted green lines). These results therefore suggest that
an econometrician using our procedure would be unlikely to infer incorrectly
that a response is signi￿cant when the true response is not.
To sum up, the experiments discussed in this section suggest that, if the
identifying assumption that the only source of unit root in labor productivity
in manufacturing is correct, our empirical ￿ndings are unlikely to be driven
by some bias inherent in our approach. We view this result as supporting
26our approach ￿ our methodology appears to lead to a correct inference of
the international transmission of technology shocks to tradables.
6 Discussion and implications for open-economy
modelling and policy analysis
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the international transmis-
sion of productivity shocks among G7 countries. Relative to the literature,
our contribution is novel in at least two respects. First, it applies time series
methods with minimal identifying assumptions to international data. Sec-
ond, we jointly study the dynamics of the international transmission and
international relative prices, distinguishing between the relative price of non-
tradables, the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
Our main result is that the international transmission of productivity
shocks in manufacturing ￿ which we identify with the tradable sector ￿
squares quite well with the main predictions of standard general equilibrium
models of the international economy, discussed in Section 2.
First, productivity gains in manufacturing lower the PPI relative to the
(services) CPI in all countries. As the latter index includes a much larger
share of nontraded goods, this is evidence in support of the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis.
However, the response of international prices is not identical across coun-
tries, but appears to vary across economies with di⁄erent size and degree
of openness. Namely, both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade
appreciate in the largest and less open economies ￿ -the US and Japan ￿
in contrast with a conventional view of the international transmission. Con-
versely, international relative prices depreciate in a small open economy such
as Italy ￿ similar results for the UK turn out to depend on assuming non-
stationarity of the real exchange rate. Results for Germany are inconclusive.
The results for the US and Japan challenge a popular view of the core
transmission mechanism in DSGE models of the international economy. They
suggest that price movements may raise the international consumption risk
of productivity ￿ uctuations, as countries with larger supplies will also rip fur-
ther gains from favorable terms of trade movements; by the same token, the
sign of the spillovers from productivity shocks may be negative, with relevant
policy implications. Namely, our results help understand the dynamics of the
27US terms of trade and real exchange rate when this country experienced a
persistent increase in productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s
￿ whereas both the relative price of US exports and the US real exchange
rate appreciated together. In this respect, the terms of trade dynamics un-
veiled by our empirical analysis run counter to the view that favorable price
movements contain national wealth di⁄erences when countries experience
(persistent) productivity growth di⁄erentials. In such circumstances, market
forces may provide much less automatic stabilization of consumption and
real income across borders than commonly believed. Finally, our evidence
suggests that terms of trade movements in the short and medium run are the
opposite of what is postulated by many observers, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
[2004], who build world-wide adjustment scenarios following a reduction of
the US current account de￿cit. Our measures of the US international price
of tradables instead appreciate on impact with productivity gains in the US
domestic tradable sector.
Second, as a general pattern, positive shocks raise total domestic con-
sumption and manufacturing output relative to their foreign counterpart, and
worsen the trade balance. The negative response of net exports is stronger
in the case of our three largest countries; it is insigni￿cant only in some spec-
i￿cations of the empirical model for Italy and the UK. The ￿nding that the
external account response is persistently negative is especially relevant for
the case of the US. Our results are at odds with the view expressed in recent
policy contributions, that productivity growth in US manufacturing could
lead to an early and relevant improvement in the US external trade balance.
According to our VAR evidence, other things equal, the dynamics of domestic
demand in response to productivity shocks is not likely to contribute to a US
current account reversal at least in the short and medium run. Instead, our
results lend support to the standard policy view that productivity growth in
the rest of the (industrial) world could help reduce the US current account
de￿cit, even when relatively concentrated in the production of tradables.
28Appendix 1 Data description and sources
United States
Labor productivity: Index of output per hour of all persons in manufacturing
sector, seasonally adjusted, 1992 = 100 (Bank of International Settlements
and Dept. of Labor).
Manufacturing output: Index of industrial production in manufacturing, sea-
sonally adjusted, 2000 = 100 (Federal Reserve Board)
Consumption: Private ￿nal consumption expenditure, volume in national
currency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database).
Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, value, market prices in national cur-
rency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Net exports:Net exports of goods & services, value in national currency, sea-
sonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
PPI index: Producer price index of manufactured products, seasonally ad-
justed, 2000 = 100 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI total: Consumer price index all items, seasonally adjusted, 2000 = 100
(OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI services: Consumer price index for services less energy services, season-
ally adjusted; 1982-84 = 100, monthly converted to quarterly averages (BLS)
Export de￿ ator: Exports of goods and services, de￿ ator, seasonally adjusted,
national accounts basis; 2000 = 100 (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
CPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of US CPI (total) to aggregate
CPI (total) of 9 OECD countries, all in current US dollars, weighted with
GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations based
on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
PPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of US PPI (manufacturing)
to aggregate PPI (manufacturing) of 9 OECD countries, all in current US
dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1971q1 = 100 (au-
thors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Terms of trade: Index of ratio of US export de￿ ator (goods and services) to
aggregate export de￿ ator (goods and services) of 9 OECD countries, all in
current US dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1
i= 100 (authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Japan
Labor productivity: Index of output per hour of all persons in manufac-
turing, obtained as ratio of industrial production to total hours worked in
manufacturing, 2000 = 100 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators).
Manufacturing output: Index of industrial production in manufacturing, sea-
sonally adjusted, 2000 = 100 (Federal Reserve Board)
Consumption: Private ￿nal consumption expenditure, volume in national
currency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database).
Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, value, market prices in national cur-
rency, seasonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Net exports:Net exports of goods & services, value in national currency, sea-
sonally adjusted (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
PPI index: Producer price index of manufactured products, seasonally ad-
justed, 2000 = 100 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI total: Consumer price index all items, seasonally adjusted, 2000 = 100
(OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
CPI services: Consumer price index for services less rents, seasonally ad-
justed; 2000 = 100 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators Database)
Export de￿ ator: Exports of goods and services, de￿ ator, seasonally adjusted,
national accounts basis; 2000 = 100 (OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
CPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of Japanese CPI (total) to ag-
gregate CPI (total) of 9 OECD countries, all in current US dollars, weighted
with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations
based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
PPI-based real exchange rate: Index of ratio of Japanese PPI (manufactur-
ing) to aggregate PPI (manufacturing) of 9 OECD countries, all in current
US dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP values, 1971q1 = 100
(authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database)
Terms of trade: Index of ratio of Japanese export de￿ ator (goods and ser-
vices) to aggregate export de￿ ator (goods and services) of 9 OECD coun-
iitries, all in current US dollars, weighted with GDP shares at annual PPP
values, 1970q1 = 100 (authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Out-
look Database)
Germany
Before 1991, all series were obtained on the basis of West Germany growth
rates applied to level variables of uni￿ed Germany.
Labor productivity: Monthly index of output per hour of all persons in manu-
facturing and mining, seasonally adjusted, 2000 = 100 (Bank of International
Settlements).
All other series are from the same sources as Japanese series, but for CPI
services which is not available.
United Kingdom
Labor productivity: (a) From 1970 to 1995:q1, quarterly index of output per
hour of all persons in manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, 1990 = 100 (Bank
of International Settlements); (b) from 1995:q1 to 2004q4 , quarterly index of
output per person in manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, 2002 = 100 (Bank
of International Settlements), divided by the quarterly index of average hours
worked per person in manufacturing (from Eurostat and ). The series were
joined by using growth rates over overlapping periods.
All other series were from the same sources as Japanese series, but for
CPI services which was not available.
Italy
Labor productivity: Hourly labor productivity in manufacturing, seasonally
adjusted, in 1995 national currency (Bank of International Settlements). A
missing value in 1999q1 was ￿lled by interpolation with output in manufac-
turing.
All other series were from the same sources as Japanese series, but for
PPI from 1970 to 1980 which is the monthly price index of domestical ￿n-
ished manufactures, 1980 = 100 (BIS). The MEI and BIS monthly series were
iiijoined by using growth rates over overlapping periods and then converted by
quarterly averaging.
Rest of the world
For each country the rest of the world comprises the other six G7 coun-
tries (alternatively US, Japan, Germany, UK, Italy, France, Canada) plus
Australia, Sweden and Ireland. This choice was dictated by data availability
regarding hourly productivity in manufacturing.
Individual country￿ s variables were aggregated by ￿rst taking quarterly
growth rates to remove national basis e⁄ects; then cross-country average
growth rates were computed with weights based on each country￿ s GDP
share in the 9-country aggregate calculated at annual purchasing power parity
(PPP) values. Average growth rates were then cumulated starting from the
initial base year to obtain levels.
Annual PPP based GDP shares are from the IMF￿ s World Economic
Outlook Database from 1980; before 1980 they were computed directly on
the basis of annual GDP at PPP values form OECD￿ s Economic Outlook
Database.
Labor productivity: Aggregate of country-speci￿c indexes of output per hour
of all persons in manufacturing sector, seasonally adjusted, 1970q1 = 100 (au-
thors calculations based on national statistical sources)
Manufacturing output: Aggregate of country-speci￿c indexes of industrial
production, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, 1970q1 = 100 (authors cal-
culations based on national statistical sources)
Consumption: Aggregate of country-speci￿c private ￿nal consumption ex-
penditure, volumes in national currency, seasonally adjusted, 1970q1 = 100
(authors calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database).
Appendix 2 Model description
Our world economy consists of two countries of equal size, as before denoted
H and F, each specialized in the production of an intermediate, perfectly
tradable good. In addition, each country produces a nontradable good. This
good is either consumed or used to make intermediate tradable goods H and
ivF available to domestic consumers. In what follows, we describe our setup fo-
cusing on the Home country, with the understanding that similar expressions
also characterize the Foreign economy ￿ whereas starred variables refer to
Foreign ￿rms and households.
The Firms￿Problem
Firms producing Home tradables (H) and Home nontradables (N) are per-
fectly competitive and employ a technology that combines domestic labor











where ZH and ZN are exogenous random disturbances, independent across
sectors and countries. Consistent with our empirical methodology, we assume
that ZH follows a unit root process. In turn, ZN follows an AR(1) process
with autocorrelation coe¢ cient equal to 0.95. We assume that capital and
labor are freely mobile across sectors. The problem of these ￿rms is standard:
they hire labor and capital from households to maximize their pro￿ts:
￿H = P H;tYH;t ￿ WtLH;t ￿ RtKH;t
￿N = PN;tYN;t ￿ WtLN;t ￿ RtKN;t;
where P H;t is the wholesale price of the Home traded good and PN;t is the
price of the nontraded good. Wt denote the wage rate, while Rt represents
the capital rental rate.
Firms in the distribution sector are also perfectly competitive. They buy
tradable goods and distribute them to consumers using nontraded goods as
the only input in production. We assume that bringing one unit of traded
goods to Home (Foreign) consumers requires ￿ units of the Home (Foreign)
nontraded goods.
The Household￿ s Problem
Preferences The representative Home agent in the model maximizes












vwhere instantaneous utility U is a function of a consumption index, C; and
leisure, (1 ￿ ‘). Foreign agents￿preferences are symmetrically de￿ned. It
can be shown that, for all parameter values used in the quantitative analysis
below, these preferences guarantee the presence of a locally unique symmetric
steady state, independent of initial conditions.31













; ￿ < 1, (B.2)




is the constant elasticity of substitution be-
tween CN;t and CT;t. The consumption index of traded goods CT;t including
both domestically produced goods CH and goods produced abroad CF, is
given by












￿ ; ￿ < 1:
Price indexes A notable feature of our speci￿cation is that, because
of distribution costs, there is a wedge between the producer price and the
consumer price of each good. Let P H;t and PH;t denote the price of the Home
traded good at the producer and consumer level, respectively. Let PN;t denote
the price of the nontraded good that is necessary to distribute the tradable
one. With competitive ￿rms in the distribution sector, the consumer price
of the traded good is simply
PH;t = P H;t + ￿PN;t: (B.3)
























31A unique invariant distribution of wealth under these preferences will allow us to use
standard numerical techniques to solve the model around a stable nonstochastic steady
state when only a non-contingent bond is traded internationally (see Obstfeld [1990],
Mendoza [1991], and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2001]).
viForeign prices, denoted with an asterisk and expressed in the same currency
as Home prices, are similarly de￿ned. We take the price of Home aggregate
consumption Pt to be the numeraire.
Budget constraints and asset markets We assume that interna-
tional asset markets are incomplete. Home and Foreign agents can only hold
an international bond, BH, which pays in units of Home aggregate consump-
tion and is zero in net supply. Agents derive income from working, Wt‘t;
from renting capital to ￿rms, RtKt, and from interest payments, (1+rt)BH;t;
where rt is the real bond￿ s yield, paid at the beginning of period t but known
at time t ￿ 1. The individual ￿ ow budget constraint for the representative
agent in the Home country is therefore:32
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t + PN;tCN;t + BH;t+1 + P H;tIH;t ￿ (B.5)
Wt‘t + RtKt + (1 + rt)BH;t:
We assume that investment is carried out in Home tradable goods and that
the capital stock, K, can be freely reallocated between the traded (KH) and
nontraded (KN) sectors:
K = KH + KN:
As opposed to consumption goods, we assume that investment goods do not
require distribution services. The price of investment is therefore equal to
the wholesale price of the domestic traded good, P H;t: The law of motion for
the aggregate capital stock is given by:
Kt+1 = IH,t + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt (B.6)
The household￿ s problem then consists of maximizing lifetime utility, de-
￿ned by (B.1), subject to the constraints (B.5) and (B.6).
Model calibration
Note that we assume symmetry across countries. We assume a utility func-





; 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ > 0; (B.7)
32BH;t denotes the Home agent￿ s bonds accumulated during period t ￿ 1 and carried
over into period t.
viiwhere {t is a taste shock assumed to follow an AR(1) process with autocor-
relation coe¢ cient equal to 0.95 and standard deviation set to 0.7 percent.
We set ￿ so that in steady state, one third of the time endowment is spent
working; ￿ (risk aversion) is set equal to 2. Following Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe [2001], we assume that the endogenous discount factor depends on
the taste shock, the average per capita level of consumption, Ct, and hours
worked, ‘t, and has the following form:
￿ (U [Ct;‘t]) =
￿
ln(1 +   [(Ct)￿(1 ￿ ‘t)1￿￿]) ￿ 6= 1
ln(1 +   [￿ln(Ct) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ ‘t)]) ￿ = 1 ;
whereas   is chosen such that the steady-state real interest rate is 1 percent
per quarter. This parameter also determines the speed of convergence to the
unique nonstochastic steady state.
Because of the presence of a distribution sector in our model, the trade
elasticity is given by ! (1 ￿ ￿): Following the calibration in Burstein, Neves
and Rebelo [2003], we set distribution costs to 50 percent. We then set the
elasticity of substitution ! to either 2 or 8, implying a trade elasticity of 1
and 4, respectively.
The value of ￿ is selected based on the available estimates for the elasticity
of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. We use the estimate
by Mendoza [1991] referred to a sample of industrialized countries and set
that elasticity equal to 0.74. Stockman and Tesar [1995] estimate a lower
elasticity (0.44), but their sample includes both developed and developing
countries.
As regards the weights of domestic and foreign tradables in the tradables
consumption basket (CT), aH and aF (normalized to aH+aF = 1) are chosen
such that imports are 5 percent of aggregate output in steady state. This
corresponds to the average ratio of U.S. imports from Europe, Canada and
Japan to U.S. GDP between 1960 and 2002. The weights of traded and
nontraded goods, aT and aN, are chosen as to match the share of nontradables
in the U.S. consumption basket. Over the period 1967-2002, this share is
equal to 53 percent on average. Consistently, Stockman and Tesar [1995]
suggest that the share of nontradables in the consumption basket of the
seven largest OECD countries is roughly 50 percent. Finally, we calibrate
￿ and ￿; the labor shares in the production of tradables and nontradables,
based on the work of Stockman and Tesar [1995]. We set the depreciation
rate of capital equal to 2.5 percent quarterly.
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xivFig. 1 Baseline specification – US 
 
             
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables in 
growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response.  
See text for details. 
 
 
 Fig. 2 Baseline specification – Japan 
 
          
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but net exports 
over GDP (NX/Y) in growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response.  
See text for details. 
 Fig. 3 Baseline specification – Germany 
 
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables in growth 
rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response.  
See text for details. Fig. 4 Baseline specification – UK 
 
 
VAR  specification  with  labor  productivity  differential  relative  to  all  other  countries,  all  variables  in 
growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response.  




VAR  specification  with  labor  productivity  differential  relative  to  all  other  countries,  all  variables  in 
growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response.  
See text for details. Fig. 6 Level specification – US 
 
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but 
real  exchange  rates  (RER)  in  growth  rates.    The  figure  reports  16th,  median,  84th  percentiles  and 
average response.  
See text for details. Fig. 7 Level specification – Japan 
 
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but real 
exchange rates (RER) and net exports over GDP (NX/Y) in growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 
84th percentiles and average response. 
See text for details. Fig. 8 Level specification – Germany 
 
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but real 
exchange rates (RER) in growth rates. The figure reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average 
response. 





VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but real 
exchange rates (RER) and net exports over GDP (NX/Y) in growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 
84th percentiles and average response. 
See text for details. Fig. 10 Level specification – Italy 
 
 
VAR specification with labor productivity differential relative to all other countries, all variables but real 
exchange rates (RER) and net exports over GDP (NX/Y) in growth rates.  The figure reports 16th, median, 
84th percentiles and average response. 
See text for details. Fig. 11 Subsample stability – US 
 
Panel A – 1973-1998 
 
See notes to Fig. 1. Fig. 11 Subsample stability – US 
 
Panel B – 1979-2004 
 
 
See notes to Fig. 1. Fig. 12 Absolute specification – US 
 
 
VAR specification with country's level of labor productivity, all variables in growth rates. The figure 
reports 16th, median, 84th percentiles and average response. 
See text for details. Fig. 13 Theoretical and VAR Impulse responses – High Trade Elasticity 
 
 
See text for a description of experiment. Fig. 14 Theoretical and VAR Impulse responses – Unitary Trade Elasticity 
 
 
See text for a description of experiment. Fig. A1 – US Dataset 
 Fig. A2 – Japan Dataset 
 Fig. A3 – Germany Dataset 
 
 Fig. A4 – UK Dataset 
 Fig. A5 – Italy Dataset 
 
 Table A1
Results of unit root tests for USA against ROW
Sample is 1973:1-2004:4
Test specification for differenced series Test specification for level series
PP* DF-GLS**
test statistic p-value*** test statistic p-value***
Labor productivity in manufacturing
USA constant 2.7669 1.00 constant, linear trend 0.008538 pvalue>0.1
ROW constant -0.7540 0.83 constant, linear trend -2.280369 pvalue>0.1
Differential constant -1.6774 0.44 constant, linear trend -0.824595 pvalue>0.1
none 0.0962 0.71 constant -0.941589 pvalue>0.1
Output differential constant 0.1959 0.97 constant, linear trend -1.407352 pvalue>0.1
none 1.8321 0.98 constant 0.917944 pvalue>0.1
Consumption differential constant 1.2960 1.00 constant, linear trend -0.262079 pvalue>0.1
none 2.0439 0.99 constant 2.798769 pvalue>0.1
Net exports over GDP none 0.0842 0.73 constant -0.087946 pvalue>0.0
constant 1.0842 0.93 constant, linear trend 0.912054 pvalue>0.1
PPI/CPI
CPI SERVICES constant 0.674595 0.9912 constant, linear trend 1.064373 pvalue>0.1
Int. relative prices
RER CPI none -0.4388 0.52 constant -1.356705 pvalue>0.1
constant -2.4182 0.14 constant, linear trend -2.059058 pvalue>0.1
RER PPI none -0.8923 0.33 constant -2.142593 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.3484 0.16 constant, linear trend -2.625866 pvalue>0.1
EXP DEF none -0.0055 0.68 constant -0.327176 pvalue>0.1
constant -1.6585 0.45 constant, linear trend -1.761566 pvalue>0.1
Notes
*Phillips-Perron test with critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996) 
**Augmented DF test modified according to Elliot et al . (1996); critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996)
***A p-value less than 0.1 (0.05) means that the null of a unit root is rejected at the 10 (5) percent confidence levelTable A2
Results of unit root tests for Japan against ROW
Sample is 1973:1-2004:4
Test specification for differenceTest specification for level series
PP* DF-GLS**
test statisticp-value*** test statistic p-value***
Labor productivity in manufacturing
Japan constant -1.581681 0.489 constant, linear trend -1.883897 pvalue>0.1
ROW constant 1.710243 0.9996 constant, linear trend -0.860656 pvalue>0.1
Differential constant -1.536393 0.5121 constant, linear trend -0.871536 pvalue>0.1
none -0.111406 0.6435 constant -0.890574 pvalue>0.1
Output differential constant -0.979977 0.759 constant, linear trend -0.792318 pvalue>0.1
none -0.1599 0.6266 constant -0.898556 pvalue>0.1
Consumption differential constant 0.038817 0.9596 constant, linear trend 0.02179 pvalue>0.1
none -0.599213 0.456 constant -0.544825 pvalue>0.1
Net exports over GDP none -1.86411 0.0596 constant -2.822581 pvalue<0.01
constant -2.814488 0.059 constant, linear trend -3.035634 pvalue<0.05
PPI/CPI
CPI SERVICES constant -1.182787 0.6806 constant, linear trend 1.064373 pvalue>0.1
Int. relative prices
RER CPI none -0.080443 0.654 constant -0.724922 pvalue>0.1
constant -2.445101 0.1316 constant, linear trend -2.0698 pvalue>0.1
RER PPI none -0.659916 0.4295 constant -1.420449 pvalue>0.1
constant -2.506998 0.1162 constant, linear trend -2.63375 pvalue>0.1
EXP DEF none -1.380222 0.155 constant -1.981002 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.217913 0.201 constant, linear trend -2.431013 pvalue>0.1
Notes
*Phillips-Perron test with critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996) 
**Augmented DF test modified according to Elliot et al . (1996); critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996)
***A p-value less than 0.1 (0.05) means that the null of a unit root is rejected at the 10 (5) percent confidence levelTable A3
Results of unit root tests for Germany against ROW
Sample is 1973:1-2004:4
Test specification for differenceTest specification for level series
PP* DF-GLS**
test statisticp-value*** test statistic p-value***
Labor productivity in manufacturing
Germany constant 0.174953 0.97 constant, linear trend -1.532099 pvalue>0.1
ROW constant 1.003887 0.9965 constant, linear trend -1.820061 pvalue>0.1
Differential constant -1.026498 0.7425 constant, linear trend -1.547087 pvalue>0.1
none 2.049603 0.9903 constant 0.512553 pvalue>0.1
Output differential constant -1.249848 0.6513 constant, linear trend -2.377607 pvalue>0.1
none -1.420197 0.1444 constant 0.220451 pvalue>0.1
Consumption differential constant 0.413563 0.9829 constant, linear trend -1.656287 pvalue>0.1
none -2.339206 0.0192 constant 2.151105 pvalue>0.1
Net exports over GDP none -0.904337 0.3227 constant -0.133904 pvalue>0.1
constant -0.7614 0.8261 constant, linear trend -1.623257 pvalue>0.1
PPI/CPI
CPI Total constant -0.078896 0.9484 constant, linear trend -1.659919 pvalue>0.1
Int. relative prices
RER CPI none -1.624913 0.0981 constant -2.191148 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.168403 0.2189 constant, linear trend -2.272668 pvalue>0.1
RER PPI none -1.301696 0.1775 constant -2.191301 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.433337 0.1347 constant, linear trend -2.346221 pvalue>0.1
EXP DEF none -0.350547 0.5569 constant -1.094891 pvalue>0.1
constant -1.884669 0.3386 constant, linear trend -2.223682 pvalue>0.1
Notes
*Phillips-Perron test with critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996) 
**Augmented DF test modified according to Elliot et al . (1996); critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996)
***A p-value less than 0.1 (0.05) means that the null of a unit root is rejected at the 10 (5) percent confidence levelTable A4
Results of unit root tests for UK against ROW
Sample is 1973:1-2004:4
Test specification for differenced series Test specification for level series
PP* DF-GLS**
test statistic p-value*** test statistic p-value***
Labor productivity in manufacturing
UK constant 0.630927 0.9901 constant, linear trend -1.485368 pvalue>0.1
ROW constant 0.762981 0.9931 constant, linear trend -2.917834 pvalue<0.1
Differential constant -1.814605 0.3721 constant, linear trend -1.521984 pvalue>0.1
none -0.334428 0.563 constant -1.30747 pvalue>0.1
Output differential constant -0.763321 0.8256 constant, linear trend -2.032963 pvalue>0.1
none -0.746914 0.3911 constant -0.489868 pvalue>0.1
Consumption differential constant -2.1273 0.2344 constant, linear trend -0.927952 pvalue>0.1
none -0.298068 0.5766 constant -0.873383 pvalue>0.1
Net exports over GDP none -1.883786 0.0571 constant -2.182391 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.300727 0.1734 constant, linear trend -2.567268 pvalue>0.10
PPI/CPI
CPI Total constant 0.452297 0.9844 constant, linear trend 1.020843 pvalue>0.1
Int. relative prices
RER CPI none -1.171089 0.2197 constant -2.101924 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.206316 0.2051 constant, linear trend -2.897819 pvalue<0.10
RER PPI none -0.291671 0.579 constant -0.501317 pvalue>0.1
constant -1.496524 0.5323 constant, linear trend -2.68954 pvalue>0.1
EXP DEF none -0.668291 0.4258 constant -0.596741 pvalue>0.1
constant -1.742741 0.4074 constant, linear trend -2.622335 pvalue>0.1
Notes
*Phillips-Perron test with critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996) 
**Augmented DF test modified according to Elliot et al . (1996); critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996)
***A p-value less than 0.1 (0.05) means that the null of a unit root is rejected at the 10 (5) percent confidence levelTable A5
Results of unit root tests for Italy against ROW
Sample is 1973:1-2004:4
Test specification for differenced series Test specification for level series
PP* DF-GLS**
test statistic p-value*** test statistic p-value***
Labor productivity in manufacturing
Italy constant -2.204301 0.2059 constant, linear trend -0.883729 pvalue>0.1
ROW constant 1.594922 0.9995 constant, linear trend -1.013203 pvalue>0.1
Differential constant 0.395478 0.9821 constant, linear trend -0.03336 pvalue>0.1
none -0.761495 0.3846 constant -0.25524 pvalue>0.1
Output differential constant -0.181216 0.9367 constant, linear trend -1.328729 pvalue>0.1
none -0.93902 0.3082 constant -0.677483 pvalue>0.1
Consumption differential constant 0.036218 0.9594 constant, linear trend -1.038549 pvalue>0.1
none -0.922371 0.3151 constant -0.151934 pvalue>0.1
Net exports over GDP none -2.455012 0.0142 constant -2.486968 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.575099 0.1008 constant, linear trend -2.844862 pvalue<0.10
PPI/CPI
CPI SERVICES constant -0.288019 0.9224 constant, linear trend -2.10485 pvalue>0.1
Int. relative prices
RER CPI none -1.911597 0.0537 constant -2.132607 pvalue<0.05
constant -2.61669 0.0922 constant, linear trend -2.548289 pvalue>0.10
RER PPI none -1.574812 0.1082 constant -1.68943 pvalue<0.1
constant -2.56929 0.1021 constant, linear trend -2.378501 pvalue>0.1
EXP DEF none 0.233667 0.7525 constant -0.361994 pvalue>0.1
constant -0.893053 0.7878 constant, linear trend -3.129265 pvalue<0.05
Notes
*Phillips-Perron test with critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996) 
**Augmented DF test modified according to Elliot et al . (1996); critical values from MacKinnon (1991, 1996)
***A p-value less than 0.1 (0.05) means that the null of a unit root is rejected at the 10 (5) percent confidence level